The France 2030 investment plan was built around an ambitious bet: transforming historic industrial strengths – steel, automotive, aerospace – into competitive pillars of a decarbonising economy. 

Five years on, the results can be seen, and new green industrial ecosystems are emerging. Battery gigafactories have been built. ArcelorMittal has taken a final investment decision for an electric arc furnace in Dunkirk. A solid pipeline of synthetic aviation fuel projects is taking shape, positioning France as a potential European leader in sustainable fuels. These are not negligible achievements. 

But without a qualitative leap in our cleantech industrial policy, we risk being unable to go much further. Whether for batteries, green steel or sustainable fuels, subsidising projects is not enough: it is the entire value chain that needs to be secured. 

Neglected links in the value chain 

In each of these sectors, the upstream sectors remain dangerously exposed. Battery gigafactories were built before supply chains for critical inputs were secured – leaving production dependent on imported materials, predominantly from China. 

On the sustainable fuels side, in the absence of long-term offtake contracts with airlines, not a single project has yet crossed the threshold of a final investment decision. The conditions are nonetheless in place for France to master the first building blocks of this value chain, from low-carbon hydrogen production to final fuel synthesis. If it ends up importing Chinese e-methanol – one of the priorities of China’s latest five-year plan – for simple conversion on French soil, it will retain only the last link in the chain. 

The mistake is to allow the gap between announced ambition and the actual construction of value chains to widen, leaving outside competitors to rush in and fill the gaps in the chain. 

Demand-side steering and budgetary coherence 

What needs to change? Too long focused on supply, industrial policy must now be structured around genuine demand-side steering: environmental and “Made in Europe” criteria in public procurement, long-term contracts to secure initial markets, standards to align private purchasing with industrial strategy. 

Budgetary coherence is also at stake. In a context of tight constraints, every public euro must earn its place. It is increasingly difficult to justify a budgetary arrangement that still channels nearly €2 billion a year in tax advantages for corporate fleets towards combustion-engine models – all the more so in the current energy context. And while the social leasing scheme announced by the government is indispensable in this same context, it will become difficult to justify such a scheme if only 18% of the vehicles leased are assembled in France. 

French sovereignty runs through Brussels 

The challenge is not to spend more – it is to stop subsidising against our own objectives. And the most powerful lever available to France lies less with Bercy than with Brussels. The Industrial Accelerator Act proposed by the Commission in March 2026 is precisely the framework that France must help shape and champion. It is in the intelligent articulation of national and European tools that industrial strategy becomes durable. 

France has the innovators, the industrial base and the policy foundations to contribute to Europe’s green reindustrialisation. The question is whether we consolidate that position – or whether we allow the gap between ambition and execution to become an opportunity for others. Industry, decarbonisation and sovereignty must now be placed firmly at the heart of the political debate ahead of the 2027 election – without forgetting to act before then. 

L’article Cleantech: after the supply-side push, time to tackle demand est apparu en premier sur I4CE.

France, autumn 2021: faced with a sharp rise in energy prices, the French government announces a package of emergency measures within a few months to protect households and businesses. Cost to the public finances from 2021 to 2024: nearly €100 billion, including €10 billion for aid directly linked to rising fuel prices alone. 

France, March 2026: faced with a sharp rise in energy prices, questions about what the government should do are resurfacing. And whilst the French local elections partially overshadowed the search for solutions to the price crisis until last week, the French government will need to stand firm in the coming weeks. Particularly on the urgent issue of oil. 

No discount at the pump 

2022 was the year of the pump discount in France, and in many other Member States. In the absence of preparation, resorting to such a measure made political sense: immediate implementation; via an existing distribution channel; and visible assistance with every fill-up. 

But this discount suffers from the same three flaws as a generalised reduction in fuel taxes. Inefficient, it benefited many households that had absolutely no need for it. A drain on public funds, it cost France €8 billion in 2022. Disastrous for sovereignty, it further trapped the country’s economy in its costly dependence on imported oil. 

Imperative in 2026, for all the EU Member States: reserve any pump discount or similar measure solely for low-income households with no alternative, and set a time limit on it. The European Council, in its conclusions on March 19, called on the Commission to present a toolbox of targeted temporary measures to address the recent spikes in the prices of imported fossil fuels.  

Energy sufficiency 

Now, however, is the time to implement an energy sufficiency plan, as France and other EU Member States did in 2022. First, individual energy sufficiency, which can be implemented immediately, at least for those who have the means to do so: carpooling, driving more slowly to reduce fuel consumption, using public transport, cycling, and working from home. 

Collective energy sufficiency next, which can be implemented in the short term. By developing public transport, and more broadly by promoting alternatives to single-occupancy car use: utilising existing road infrastructure with cycle lanes or express bus lanes; using the current vehicle fleet to develop carpooling routes; developing on-demand transport with electric vehicles; and reducing speed limits. Local authorities will be key in implementing this collective aspect. 

Going electric 

Finally, let us remember that the problem with petrol prices at the pump… is petrol itself. Now is the time to switch to electric. A household with an old combustion-engine vehicle that buys an electric vehicle on credit saves around ten euros a month. Immediately. The millions of households that have already switched to electric are, in fact, largely spared by the rise in fuel prices. 

For low- and middle-income households, the high initial cost of an electric vehicle is a barrier. In France, social leasing has already enabled 100,000 low-income households to acquire one in 2024 and 2025. Expanding similar schemes across more EU Member States would provide permanent protection for more households, at a minimal cost. In the case of France, protecting a further 200,000 households each year would cost €1.6 billion per year – equivalent to a widespread discount at the pump of just 3 cents per litre. 

And for households unable to benefit from the scheme immediately, targeted, time-limited support with priority access to future leasing schemes. A way of preparing for the transition ahead. And of revealing latent demand to car manufacturers, as a prelude to ambitious electrification plans led by Member States. 

L’article Energy crisis: protecting people in the long term est apparu en premier sur I4CE.

Since 2005, the Emissions Trading System (ETS) has imposed an emissions cap on European industry. This public policy is unique in terms of its scale – it covers 40% of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions, including the electricity sector, energy-intensive industries and intra-European flights – and in terms of how it is implemented: quotas are tradable and, after a running-in period, prices have stabilised, reaching €60 to €80 per ton of CO2 in 2025. 

By gradually reducing the volume of quotas, the ETS has enabled emissions to be cut by almost half in twenty years. At these price levels, it has also stimulated innovation among manufacturers. 

2026 will see two major developments in the ETS. To reduce the risk of relocation to countries with lower carbon prices, energy-intensive sectors have until now benefited from free quotas: these will be gradually reduced until they are completely phased out in 2034. This is what worries manufacturers. 

On the other hand, to protect the European market, a carbon border adjustment mechanism has been put in place. However, it does not protect export industries. This fundamental issue can be addressed without weakening the ETS, as proposed, for example, by the Institut Montaigne. This is the first imperative.

Low-carbon leadership 

To ensure not only the survival of its industry but also its development, Europe must break free from its costly dependence on imported fossil fuels. It must therefore assume low-carbon technological leadership, the only sustainable guarantee of export competitiveness. 

This requires more innovation and more electrification. With the rise of renewables and the spectacular fall in storage costs, Europe has an increasingly abundant potential decarbonisation resource, from which manufacturers will benefit. France is particularly well placed in this respect, with abundant electricity and a good supply of biomass for decarbonisation. 

A firm hand 

It is therefore not a question of weakening the ETS, but of strengthening it. Restricting its scope or delaying its timetable would penalise manufacturers who have chosen to invest in decarbonisation and discourage future investment at a time when, on the contrary, we need to accelerate. 

The second imperative is to maintain the gradual reduction of free allowances, giving visibility to manufacturers. The auctioning of allowances enables Member States to recover substantial revenues. In France, the allowances auctioned to date represent around €2 billion per year, a figure that is set to increase. 

Supporting industry, promoting innovation 

In the future, allowances will also need to provide more substantial funding for the decarbonisation of European industrial sectors – this is the third imperative. It should be noted that this is already the case in France: French industry now receives much more for decarbonisation than it pays for the ETS. The fourth imperative is to strengthen the carbon border adjustment mechanism, for example by extending it to downstream sectors. 

The fifth and final imperative is to avoid getting bogged down in negotiations on a price cap, which could result in a very low price that would undermine the economic model of many projects and stifle innovation. It would be better to negotiate a floor price that would give manufacturers greater visibility, but this would then need to be financed. 

The same applies to the ETS as to the other components of the Green Deal: flexibility in implementation must not compromise the credibility of the objectives. This would send a disastrous signal of indecision to businesses. In an increasingly hostile international context, Europe must remain firm. This is the best service it can do for its industry. 

L’article To strengthen European industry, let’s strengthen the ETS est apparu en premier sur I4CE.

Just before the start of COP30 in Belém, EU Member States agreed to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 90% in 2040 compared to 1990 levels, including a 5% flexibility through international carbon credits. 

While this target provides medium-term visibility, a first milestone for 2030 is currently ahead. By then, Member are expected to reduce their emissions by 55% compared to 1990 levels. With only five years remaining, it is worth assessing whether the current pace of climate-related investment is sufficient to achieve the EU’s 2030 targets. 

In its latest report, The State of Europe’s climate investment, I4CE tracks climate investments and the associated investment needs in relation to the EU’s 2030 targets. This analysis includes, among others, the energy production sector, its transport and storage, and the production of clean technologies.

Read the full article on Inett’s website

L’article EU Member States set 2040 climate target – but is the Union on track for 2030 in the energy sector? est apparu en premier sur I4CE.

Developing climate strategies is a critical first step to defining financial institutions’ contributions to the achievement of global climate objectives. In line with existing guidance (e.g. ISSB standards on climate-related disclosures), financial institutions can address the following areas when committing to climate strategies. 

Read the article on Proparco

L’article Financial institutions’ climate role: from commitments to action est apparu en premier sur I4CE.

The most notable takeaway is the requirement to ‘develop a single, comprehensive strategic planning process’ that meets all regulatory and business needs to prepare for the transition. Banks should leverage this holistic approach to ensure consistent transition plans whether for prudential or regulatory purposes (such as CSRD and CSDDD). The need for consistency – a point already reiterated by I4CE – also fuels the debate on the upcoming omnibus ‘simplification’ regulation through which the European Commission (EC) aims to reduce firms’ sustainability reporting requirements by 25%.

Read more on Net Zero Investor

L’article EBA’s new guidelines offer a beacon of hope amid regulatory uncertainty est apparu en premier sur I4CE.

The Green Deal era saw Europe embrace ‘Cleantech 2.0’, with record investments and new projects. Yet 2024 has brought a reckoning. Slowing demand in sectors like heat pumps and electric cars, Chinese industrial overcapacity, and attractive subsidies in the US and Canada have left European cleantech struggling to compete.

Closures, layoffs, and stalled projects – including the high-profile collapse of Swedish battery maker Northvolt – have shaken the sector. The EU’s Net Zero Industry Act and the upcoming Clean Industrial Deal aim to support cleantech manufacturing, but catching up isn’t enough.

To lead globally, the EU must focus on the next wave, including new battery chemistries and next-gen renewables – ‘Cleantech 3.0.’

Read the article in Euractiv

L’article The EU’s research & innovation programme can power a cleantech revolution est apparu en premier sur I4CE.

Unveiling the Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA) earlier this year, Ursula Von Der Leyen declared it would “create the best conditions for those sectors that are crucial for us to reach net-zero by 2050: technologies like wind turbines, heat pumps, solar panels, renewable hydrogen as well as CO2 storage.”

Progress in the development of the cleantech sector still needs to be faster, and investment across EU member states is unevenly spread. And despite the best intentions, it is unclear whether the Act, which MEPs vote on this week, will rectify this.

The Net Zero Industry Act sets ambitious targets for increasing Europe’s cleantech manufacturing capacity. However, tweaking the EU’s regulatory architecture will only get us so far. To truly grow Europe’s green industry, an ambitious, EU-level Cleantech Investment Plan should be the next priority.

The EU’s current investment offer is not up to this challenge.  The Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), the proposed investment package supporting the Act, lacks muscle. If passed, it would see just €10 billion of public funds invested across cleantech, deep tech (such as AI) and biotech – hardly enough to spark an EU-wide wave of growth. For perspective, Germany offered the same to one microchip plant, and has spent billions more in subsidies to its economy.

Read the article in Euractiv’

L’article Cleantech divide looms in Europe est apparu en premier sur I4CE.

The finance bill is here again! It confirms Élisabeth Borne and Emmanuel Macron’s commitments to reducing our dependence on fossil fuels, with increased spending on the ecological transition. Support for the renovation of buildings, public transport, electric vehicles and the agricultural transition will increase by €7 billion in the upcoming 2024 State budget.

This “unprecedented” effort, in the words of the executive, must be sustained for the long term. The report by Jean Pisani-Ferry and Selma Mahfouz estimates that an additional thirty billion euros of public money will be needed per year to finance the transition by 2030. At the same time, balancing the budget will become increasingly challenging: indeed, bringing the tariff shield to an end in 2024 allows considerable leeway.

How can such an effort be maintained for the long term? The public authorities must address two questions: how can the State anticipate public funding needs, both from the State itself and also from local authorities? And how can we attract private sector funds by giving visibility to the sector, and thus ensure the completion of the transition’s “financing plan”.

Towards a public “business plan” for the ecological transition 

A public finance programming law dedicated to the ecological transition would provide an answer to these two questions. While this option has, regrettably, been ruled out for the time being, a major step forward has been taken in the public finance programming law, which is intended to act as a roadmap for the French budgetary pathway until the end of the five-year term, for which the Prime Minister used Article 49.3, allowing the Bill to be passed without a vote. This law, amended by parliamentarians, stipulates that the government must submit a multi-year strategy to Parliament every year that sets out the funding for the ecological transition and the national energy policy. It also requires that this strategy should be debated by the National Assembly and the Senate.

One may be surprised to learn that a long-term economic transformation, such as the ecological transition, has thus far been conducted without a clear definition of the financing and public budgetary effort. Year after year, finance bill after finance bill, the question of “who will pay” over the long term is not addressed. Furthermore, party leaders, from Éric Ciotti to Marine Tondelier, have called for more financial perspectives on the transition, following their meeting in early September with Élisabeth Borne.

From 2024 onwards, the Government will be required to set out its multi-year strategy for financing the transition on an annual basis before the finance bill is assessed, and to put it up for discussion. This will enable the Government and Parliament to anticipate the need for public money; and local authorities and the private sector – which will finance the bulk of the transition – to benefit from medium-term visibility and to make informed choices regarding the necessary investment in both assets and human capital. We are finally drawing nearer to a management method with which the private sector is familiar: a medium-term business plan, discussed with governance, and reviewed each year to adjust for anything that is not going according to plan.

How can we build this type of business plan for the State? One thing is certain: the transition cannot be financed simply through large-scale public subsidies, without standards or taxation; and nor will it be financed purely by setting the “right” carbon price and adding a dash of green finance. The right balance of measures to mobilize depends on the objective and the sector to be transformed. To have a useful debate on the most effective and equitable ways of financing the transition, parliamentarians will have to move beyond party lines. And the Government will need to play the game.

This OpEd was originally published in “Les Échos”

L’article France will (finally) adopt a strategy to finance the ecological transition est apparu en premier sur I4CE.

United we stand, divided we fall

The US, China, Japan, and other large economies are pinning their economic futures on decarbonisation and cleantech. Their ambition is underpinned by ambitious industrial policies and public investment plans (such as the IRA). The EU is lacking this, and instead relies of a patchwork of EU and national initiatives, leading to an estimated 0.34% of EU GDP of public investments that support clean technologies every year. By contrast, the IRA alone represents yearly investment of between 0.2-0.6% of US GDP, coming on top of other US federal programmes like the Infrastructure, the Chips Act, and major US State-level initiatives.

Without greater public investment, the EU will fall behind in the global cleantech race and seeing the competitiveness of its historic industries falter. Attempts at an EU response, namely the Green Deal Industrial Plan, have so far proved insufficient to face the scale of the competitiveness challenge Europe faces. Businesses across Europe are therefore calling for far greater ambition, while threatening to relocate operations across the Atlantic.

What is required is a truly European green industrial policy, which must address three key issues:

First, creating an industrial policy that can put the Green Deal to work. The EU’s common economic policies have so far centred around maintaining a level playing field between member states, the cohesion of economic development and nurturing innovation. A common industrial policy must build on this and add another step to face the challenges of the 21st century and help Europe reach its climate goals. Climate innovation should be supported to scale and reach the market quickly, supply chains should be made more resilient to secure European energy security and existing industries should be supported to decarbonise to ensure an economy-wide transformation.

Second, find a solution to close the climate investment gap, currently estimated at €360bn a year. Amid an economic crisis and at a time when other large economies are betting big on cleantech, the European public investment options currently remain too complex, too small – or both.  For a truly European response, national budgets are not sufficient. A common industrial policy must create the space for more European funds to be spent quickly, simply and strategically. In the short term, the best option is to increase public funding dedicated to the EU Innovation Fund.

Third, a more effective European governance structure is required if the EU is to match American and Chinese peer institutions’ ability to act. Ambitious policy will have little effect unless the institutions that implement it take up a spirit of courage and creativity. Long permitting timelines should be accelerated, complex funding criteria simplified. This will not be achieved overnight. Member States will need to empower the EU’s institutions to take a more entrepreneurial, less risk-averse role, in investing and transforming Europe’s clean industrial sector.

Clean industries made in Europe

Europe’s decarbonisation, and the transition from fossil power to clean, climate neutral production poses a once-in-a-generation challenge.  Greening European industry and supporting EU cleantech is not a recipe for deindustrialization. Quite the opposite: as liquified natural gas prices look set to remain high, European industries need to get clean to maintain competitiveness. A green industrial policy should underpin such a new European economic model.

Businesses leaders, researchers and citizens in the EU are ready to take on the challenge of a global cleantech race. Yet without Member State support for a common industrial policy, it is unlikely that the next Commission will be able to fully play its part. The leaders of the bloc’s two largest economies, France and Germany, need to send a clear signal that a European approach to green industrial policy and climate investments must be the foundation for the prosperity of the future.

Read the article on Euractiv’

L’article Call for a European Green Industrial Policy est apparu en premier sur I4CE.