CLIMATE BRIEF N°40

Climate governance & the Paris Agreement: the bold gamble of transnational cooperation

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ABSTRACT

- **The political process introduced by COP21 has enabled a new avenue for multilateral cooperation on climate action.** This new process focuses largely on cooperation and inclusivity to encourage all actors, public and private, to commit and act for the climate. In contrast to simply sharing the burden of emissions reduction effort, this dynamic encourages actors to explore and capitalized on benefits and co-benefits of climate action. Overall, this new approach moves away from the constrained climate framework advocated by the Kyoto Protocol, and as a result has encouraged an unprecedented level of climate commitment from both States and non-state actors.
- The Paris Agreement sets the objective to develop climate-resilience and reach net-zero anthropogenic GHG emissions by the end of the 21st century. **While such a cooperative approach of the climate political multilateralism cannot guarantee the achievement of the long-term climate goals, it does create a dynamic that could catalyze the necessary climate action.** Thus, the credibility of this process to achieve results that are consistent with the long-term goals established by the Paris Agreement will depend on the capacity of actors to transform ambitions into concrete actions which can be strengthened over time.
- **A stringent transparency process will be necessary to assess the compatibility of all commitments with long-term goals as well as to identify potential avenues to achieve those objectives.** The role to coordinate and communicate on climate actions will be performed by the UNFCCC, the COP Presidencies and their partners as well as the wider international academic community. Meanwhile, the UNFCCC will also maintain a regulatory framework that provides visibility on the actions undertaken by Parties.
- **This new transnational approach of climate governance also relies on (i) multiple cooperative frameworks** to accelerate sharing of best practices and afford access to low-carbon solutions for all Parties and actors, and **(ii) a stronger "peer-pressure" system** to maintain and enhance existing commitments and actions from all stakeholders.

I. Climate governance from Kyoto to Paris: from a "restrictive" to a "collective and dynamic" political process

THE STALEMATE OF THE BURDEN SHARING RATIONALE

Since its creation, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has the ultimate objective to resolve issues related to the protection of the global commons[1] In order to achieve this objective, the notion of dividing the remaining global carbon budget[2] equitably – if possible – has risen. This concept was notably carried over at the political level using the "contraction & convergence" model, elaborated at the beginning of the 1990's by the Global Commons Institute.[3] Thereafter, the Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997, became the primary political tool to address and mitigate global emissions. It created and implemented an international emissions trading system of carbon allowances for developed countries that have ratified the protocol (Annex B countries), materializing partly the burden sharing rationale. In addition to motivating emissions reduction commitments from parties in its first commitment period (2008-2012), the flexibility mechanisms introduced by the Kyoto Protocol[4] helped to mobilise cooperative mechanisms within the UNFCCC.[5] However, in practice these mechanisms have also demonstrated their limitations as political and economic tools.[6]

Although the Kyoto Protocol has been extended to the 2013-2020 period, its binding nature and inability to evoke a high level of climate ambition from all Parties have impacted the progress of COP negotiations under the UNFCCC.

This restricted approach has shown particularly prohibitive for both Annex I Parties – to propose ambitious commitments – and non-Annex I Parties – to get involved in climate action –, and thus for the ultimate goal of the UNFCCC. As a result, and facing the complexity of mitigating GHG emissions in a very limited time horizon, UNFCCC negotiations have reconsidered the way States should commit on climate.

THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW CLIMATE GOVERNANCE BASED ON THE WILL OF STATES

The inability of COP15 in Copenhagen to reach a universal climate agreement contributed to a shift toward a fragmented system based on voluntary commitments as opposed to legally binding commitments.

In 2011, the UNFCCC, by launching the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform (ADP), which would prepare the Paris Agreement, initiated a negotiation process based on the voluntary cooperation of each Party. This was not a new concept since voluntary commitments had already been proposed by developing countries in 2007 through the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action (NAMAs). After COP15, the ADP extended this voluntary approach in an effort to define a new format for national climate commitments which ultimately gave rise to Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) in 2013 during COP19 and 2014 during COP20. After COP20, the UNFCCC called on Parties to submit INDCs prior to COP21, as part of ADP negotiations. Since then, 189 INDCs were communicated by Parties, representing 98.7% of global GHG emissions in 2011[7] – including Land Use, Land Use Change & Forestry (LULUCF) –, pending their firsts Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) by 2020. In addition to this new bottom-up process, several other factors have also contributed to the recent evolution of international climate governance.

THE GROWING ROLE OF THE UNFCCC IN STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

For several years, the UNFCCC process has also capitalized on the institutionalization of international cooperation by establishing mechanisms of cooperation and support.[8] Several of these help to provide international support in the form of finance, technology transfer, and capacity building. Indeed, some of these mechanisms already have an operational framework, such as the Technology Mechanism established at COP16 (operationalized at COP18), or the Green Climate Fund created at COP16 (operational since 2015). These mechanisms will be reinforced by

1 *UNFCCC, Article 2 (Objective), 1992: "The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, […] stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system."*

2 *The carbon budget is a maximum amount of CO_2 emissions to avoid too high increase of temperature level. The IPCC indicates that the scenario resulting in 66% chance of respecting a limit of 2°C increase in global temperature is about to emit less than 1000 $GtCO_2$ from 2011, that is a little less than thirty years with emission levels of 2011.*

3 *For more information on the "contraction & convergence" model and political support received by these model, see the Global Commons Institute website: http://www.gci.org.uk/index.html*

4 *UNFCCC flexibility mechanisms are described in Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol.*

5 *In fact, the first real cooperative activities within the UNFCCC were the Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) under its Pilot Phase, launched in 1995. For more information, see the dedicated section on the UNFCCC website: http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/activities_implemented_jointly/items/2307.php*

6 *For more information, see Shishlov L. et al. (2016). "Compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in the first commitment period". Climate Policy Vol. 16, Iss. 6. June 2016: http://www.i4ce.org/download/i4ce-published-a-peer-reviewed-article-in-climate-policy-on-compliance-of-the-parties-to-the-kyoto-protocol-in-the-first-commitment-period/*

7 *Calculation made by I4CE – Institute for Climate Economics, July 2016*

8 *For more information on Cooperation & Support within the UNFCCC, see the dedicated section on the UNFCCC website: http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/items/2664.php*

appropriate multilateral initiatives accompanying this international framework.[9]

THE RISE OF VOLUNTARY, MULTILATERAL AND MULTI-STAKEHOLDER COOPERATIVE APPROACHES

The widening GHG emissions gap for the pre-2020 period, highlighted by *The Emissions Gap Report* (UNEP, 2014)[10] has convinced some stakeholders of the necessity to expand the scope of climate action beyond governments. It therefore became increasingly relevant to focus on voluntary cooperative initiatives by public and private actors that could result in climate and non-climate related benefits and co-benefits within different areas (economics, development, health, etc.). These voluntary initiatives are able to build the required technical (e.g. institutional arrangements, capacity-building), technological and financial capacity for effective climate action without having to wait for international coordination or government actions.

Thus, since a few years, States' commitments within the UNFCCC are gradually reinforce and by international cooperative initiatives (ICIs) on climate change that have the added value encompassing a wide range of individual and cooperative actions from both public private actors[11],and can take various form of cooperation.

The idea of ICIs is not new[12], nevertheless, delineating ICIs into categories is a delicate exercise that illustrates the "complex" and "polycentric" nature of this new climate governance architecture (Keohane, Victor, 2011; Ostrom, 2009). At this stage, the term "Action Agenda", has been adopted to regroup as a whole all climate initiatives that catalyze commitments and actions from all stakeholders (including all ICIs and non-state actors' unilateral commitments) to better accommodate this new architecture. An eponymous research group uses the "groundswell" of climate actions to describe this new trend (Galvanazing the Groundswell of Climate Actions – GGCA, 2015).

CATALYZING CLIMATE ACTIONS AND BUILDING SECTORAL SOLUTION CLUSTERS WITH THE ACTION AGENDA

The first concrete manifestation of the Action Agenda materialized on the international stage at the Climate Summit in New York hosted by Ban Ki-moon, in September 2014, where a number of climate initiatives were launched.[13] The summit's role was to catalyze, collect and promote initiatives that encourage stakeholders (States and non-state actors) to make new climate commitments, and thus complement or even boost the UNFCCC process prior to COP21.[14] The aim was, and is to create a mutually beneficial and mutually reinforced relationship between the Action Agenda and the UNFCCC process.

Since COP20 and throughout 2015, the Action Agenda was jointly coordinated by the Peruvian and French Presidencies, along with the United Nations and UNFCCC Secretariats, as part of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA) which became the Global Climate Action Agenda (GCAA) in May 2016. This multilateral cooperation has enabled the launch of the Non-State Actor Zone for climate Action[15] (NAZCA), at COP20 which records the unilateral commitments on climate from businesses, cities, regions and investors.[16]

9 *For example, on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD+), the UN-REDD Programme supports nationally led REDD+ processes and promotes the informed and meaningful involvement of all stakeholders, including indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent communities, in national and international REDD+ implementation.*

10 *The Emissions Gap Report 2014 estimates the emissions gap in 2020 is 8–10 Gt CO_2e (52 minus 44 and 54 minus 44) to stay within the 2°C limit.*

11 *International or regional organizations, national or local governments, public or private financial institutions, businesses, research institutions, NGOs and civil society, networks, coalitions, partnerships, consortiums, etc.*

12 *Notably similar initiatives, such as "Type II partnerships" launched in 2002 as part of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg.*

13 *While the Summit introduced many initiatives, the 'Action Agenda' (per se) did not emerge until after COP20.*

14 *The UNSG spent significant time ahead of the Climate Summit catalyzing and orchestrating initiatives and partnerships: some emerged organically "bottom up" and some were launched midwifed by the UNSG.*

15 *For more information, see the NAZCA platform: http://climateaction.unfccc.int/*

16 *On October 28th, 2016, the NAZCA platform counts 11,615 total commitments, including 2,364 from cities, 167 from regions, 2,090 from businesses, 448 from investors, et 236 from civil society organisations.*

BOX 1 – PORTALS THAT LIST INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE INITIATIVES

At this stage, the two main platforms listing existing ICIs are:

- the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) section on ICIs, recently developed to replace the Lima-Paris Action Agenda (LPAA) portal, listing 77 ICIs;
- the Climate Initiatives Platform, launched by Ecofys, Norden, the Institute for Sustainability Leadership from Cambridge University, and the World Resources Institute, and now hosted and maintained by UNEP DTU Partnership since January 1st, 2016, listing 231 ICIs.

FIGURE N°1 – INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE INITIATIVES (ICIs) BY THEME*



* Some of the 231 ICIs referenced in the platform regroup multiple themes.

Source: I4CE according to data from the Climate initiatives platform, October 2016

Thereafter, the initiators of the LPAA created a portal on the UNFCCC website[17] that reference ICIs encouraging unilateral commitments which then could be found on the NAZCA platform. In most cases, these ICIs catalyze unilateral commitments by creating the framework of cooperation to enable new unilateral commitments and/or by proposing common goals that are delineated by new or additional multilateral commitments. Since then the LPAA portal has been replaced by a section specifically dedicated to ICIs within the NAZCA platform.[18]

Besides acting as a catalyst for the political process of the Action Agenda, the LPAA had other strategic functions including: building sectorial clusters of action to facilitate dialogue and cooperation between the stakeholders involved in a sector of climate action. As such, a major objective of the LPAA was to identify and develop some sectoral ICIs while trying to define narratives of action for some of the various identified sectors.[19] Like the Climate Summit in September 2014, during COP21 each of these sectors were engaged in a thematic focus event that encouraged more ICIs and the consolidation of existing ones.[20]

THE "CLUB" APPROACH: CHOOSING EXCLUSIVITY TO OFFER POLITICAL & ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR ENHANCED CLIMATE ACTION

ICIs can offer exclusive benefits to their members. This type of cooperation is structured in the rationale of a "club". By offering a confined coordination, these clubs can enable groups to manage complex political and economic issues such as carbon pricing, and thus enhance the global climate ambition among their members. In the context of emissions trading systems (ETS) for example, it could be progressive, partial, total or indirect linking of several ETS between the members of the club, with or without a phase-in period. Such links should help reduce the mitigation costs and help increase the ambition of climate policies at the domestic level (Keohane et al., 2015). In practice, beyond ETS, very few ICIs can be defined as clubs as most do not satisfy the condition of providing excludable benefits to members (Green, 2015).

II. The Paris Agreement: a new climate regime in favour of cooperative approaches

The evolution toward more collaborative climate action has especially impacted the way the UNFCCC negotiations unfolded ahead of COP21. Indeed, voluntary and cooperative approaches have helped identify the need to further improve the dissemination and adoption of best practices among all relevant stakeholders.

17 *For more information, see the LPAA portal: http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa/*

18 *See Box 1.*

19 *The twelve sectors identified by the LPAA are: Agriculture, Forests, Transports, Renewable Energy, Energy Access & Efficiency, Resilience, Cities & Subnationals, Private Finance, Business, Innovation, Building, Short Lived Climate Pollutants.*

20 *Pour an overview outcome of the Action Day and the 12 "Focuses" held from 1-8 December under the Lima to Paris Action Agenda (LPAA) during COP21, see the press release: http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa/lpaa/massive-mobilization-by-non-state-stakeholders-summarized-at-cop21/*

ENHANCING PRE-2020 AMBITION: INTEGRATING THE ACTION AGENDA WITHIN THE UNFCCC BY SHARING BEST PRACTICES

As part of the ADP, discussions have been held since 2012 on pre-2020 ambition through a technical examination process of opportunities with high mitigation potential. This notably takes the form of Technical Expert Meetings (TEM) that enable the sharing of expertise and best practices on specific climate-related issues.[21] Such forums are very useful for countries - especially developing countries - and operationalize the cooperative functions of the UNFCCC. These meetings regularly lead to technical papers that provide information on the mitigation benefits of certain actions, and provide options to enhance mitigation ambition. At the end of 2015, all these elements were collected and consolidated by the UNFCCC Secretariat within a micro-website, *Climate Action 2020*.[22]

At COP20, countries agreed to maintain TEMs over the 2015-2020 period. One year later, the COP21 Decision gave this process elevated status by integrating the Action Agenda into the UNFCCC political process.[23] The technical examination process of opportunities now became extended to adaptation. At this stage, strengthening links between the TEMs, the NDCs and the Action Agenda, as well as UNFCCC related-institutions such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Technology Executive Committee (TEC), and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), could help trigger a mutually reinforcing dynamic. Another outcome was the decision to prepare annual high-level summits for at least 5 years in order to sustain the dynamics of the Action Agenda within the UNFCCC. Moreover, each year, "high-level champions" will be selected by the COP Presidencies with the aim to sustain the momentum of the Action Agenda, notably by liaising between the UNFCCC and stakeholder actions on climate. In May 2016, Laurence Tubiana for the French Presidency, and Hakima El Haite for the Moroccan Presidency, were named champions for the period between COP21 and COP22. [24]

In the summer of 2016, the high-level champions collected 62 submissions for the GCAA roadmap: 54 from non-Party stakeholders (incl. think tanks, NGOs, companies, business networks, trade unions and international organizations), and 8 from Parties[25]. In September 2016, these submissions were synthesized in a report by the COP21 and COP22 Presidencies[26]. All this information should help to finalize the necessary institutional arrangements for the Action Agenda.

COOPERATIVE APPROACHES ESTABLISHED UNDER ARTICLE 6 OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT: TOWARDS NEW TRANSFER MECHANISMS BETWEEN PARTIES

In the Paris Agreement[27], Article 6 is devoted to cooperative approaches. Paragraph 1 states that countries "choose to pursue voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions and to promote sustainable development and environmental integrity." [28]

Furthermore, Article 6 includes a provision which permits Parties to use "Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes" (ITMOs) to meet NDCs. Article 6 also introduces a new flexibility mechanism which will "contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable development".[29] Like the Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol, this mechanism could allow Parties to the Paris Agreement to obtain emissions credits for emissions reductions realized in another country which has ratified the Agreement too. Rules supporting the environmental integrity of ITMOs are yet to be defined and so its format and benefits are not entirely clear at this stage. Metrics and modalities of ITMOs should be established by the entry into force of the Agreement.[30]

Article 6 also recognizes the importance of non-market approaches (NMA). In doing so, it includes within its scope all types of cooperative approaches which can assist Parties in the implementation of their NDCs. This inclusion represents progress compared to the Kyoto Protocol, which only provided for cooperation using market-based mechanisms.

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21 Since 2014, 10 TEMs have been held on the following topics: Energy Efficiency; Renewable Energy; Urban Environment; Land Use; Carbon capture, use and storage; Non-CO_2 greenhouse gases; Energy efficiency in urban environments; Renewable energy supply; Transport; Social and Economic Value of Carbon

22 For more information, see the Climate Action 2020 microsite: http://climateaction2020.unfccc.int/

23 UNFCCC, Decision 1.CP/21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Section IV.

24 In June 2016, the two high-level champions have released a strategic note establishing their priorities for COP22: http://newsroom.unfccc.int/climate-action/global-climate-action-agenda/

25 For more information on the submissions on the roadmap for GCAA, see the dedicated section on the UNFCCC website: http://unfccc.int/documentation/items/9636.php

26 For more information on the synthesis of submissions on the roadmap for GCAA, see the synthesis report: http://newsroom.unfccc.int/climate-action/synthesis-report-submissions-on-the-roadmap-for-global-climate-action/

27 For a broader overview on the COP21 Decision on the Adoption of the Paris Agreement, see Bultheel et al. (2015). "COP21: a successful "end of the beginning"". Climate Brief n°38. I4CE – Institute for Climate Economics. December 2015: http://www.i4ce.org/download/climatebrief__cop21/

28 UNFCCC, Decision 1.CP/21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Article 6, Paragraph 1.

29 UNFCCC, Decision 1.CP/21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Article 6, Paragraph 4.

30 For more information on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, see Dahan et al. (2016). "The Paris Agreement: a new international framework to facilitate the update of carbon pricing". I4CE – Institute for Climate Economics. March, 2016: http://www.i4ce.org/download/the-paris-agreement-a-new-international-framework-to-facilitate-the-uptake-of-carbon-pricing/

FIGURE N°2 – THE NEW CLIMATE GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE : A MULTILATERALCOOPERATIVE AND DYNAMIC FRAMEWORK



Source: I4CE, November 2016

Furthermore, the recognition of the "social, economic and environmental value of voluntary mitigation actions and their co-benefits for adaptation, health and sustainable development"[31] in the COP21 Decision has also confirmed the role of cooperative approaches within the climate political multilateralism.

THE CONSECRATION OF A DYNAMIC SYSTEM FOR STATES' COMMITMENTS: THE CHOICE OF ESCALATION TO ACHIEVE THE LONG-TERM GOALS

The new climate governance structure enshrined in the Paris Agreement is based on a dynamic process that leaves it to states to enhance the ambition of their national commitments. It introduces a provision known as the ratcheting-up mechanism that requires Parties to revise NDCs upwards every five years from 2020.[32] This could better integrate the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities with Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC). The framework of this dynamic approach differs from the Kyoto Protocol system where commitments were fixed over a given period and thus incompatible with the periodical reviews required for a rapid transition to a low-carbon world. With this system, all relevant cooperative approaches could be grafted into a multilateral process of continuous enhancement of global climate ambition. However, much progress still to be made to make this system as transparent as possible, to ensure the sustainability of this system.

III. Towards a global transparency system for climate action: next steps for effective coordination

The 2015 Paris Climate Summit consolidated the transition of international climate governance from a "regulatory" to a "catalytic and facilitative" regime (Hale, 2016). The Paris Agreement encourages climate policymakers to focus on the implementation and the ratcheting up of all commitments from States and non-state actors. There are now two systems of climate governance at play to enhance climate action. The first, is the NDCs implementation and ratcheting up system led by policymakers. The second is a system that involves non-policymakers, and will be based on an advanced peer-pressure system. This system, aptly called 'name and shame' or 'name and fame', aims to impact Parties' as well as non-state actor's commitments. These systems must be sustained and strengthened to ensure the transition towards a low-carbon climate-resilient world can be made sustainably. The COP21 Decision and the Paris Agreement have made clear progress on the need to develop a transparency framework for all Parties to the Agreement, however, for non-states actors, these transparency measures will need to be taken as soon as possible.

ESTIMATE THE ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE INITIATIVES TO THE DECARBONISATION EFFORT

The political process leading to the Action Agenda and all the subsequent commitments show that we now need to capitalize on all the cooperative initiatives and actions to enhance the political dynamic and ambition from all actors. Following the wave of new initiatives prior to COP21, the challenge ahead is not so much to continue launching new ICIs but rather to ensure that existing initiatives have a real and long-lasting impact on climate.

The question of impacts on climate - such as emissions reductions - estimated or accounted by both ICIs and by States, is the first challenge. A recent study by the PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (ibid., 2015)[33] has evaluated thirteen ICIs representing a total potential in emissions reductions of 2.5 $GtCO_2e$ by 2020 and 5.5 $GtCO_2e$ by 2030. The study estimates that the overlap of these initiatives with current national climate policies (INDCs excluded) represents 70% of this potential. Some ICIs undertake or encourage emissions reductions which are additional to government actions while others largely driven by governmental actions (UNEP, 2015b). If it is the case that ICIs are largely driven by momentum achieved through government initiatives, then the individual potential of ICIs to close the emissions gap of NDCs is diminished. On the other hand, ICIs that support government actions lend them credibility and could enhance ambition in the medium and long-term.

Additionally, in order to ensure the effectiveness of ICIs with similar objectives, the tendency for these initiatives to overlap and create inefficiency needs to be addressed.[34] This calls for the establishment of some coordination to enable a more effective multi-stakeholder action.

Finally, most existing analysis of ICIs highlights two main issues: effectiveness of ICIs at achieving political objectives and their legitimacy in terms of the transparency

31 *UNFCCC, Decision 1.CP/21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Section IV, Paragraph 109.*

32 *UNFCCC, Decision 1.CP/21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Article 3: "As nationally determined contributions to the global response to climate change, all Parties are to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts as defined in Articles 4, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 13 with the view to achieving the purpose of this Agreement as set out in Article 2. The efforts of all Parties will represent a progression over time, while recognizing the need to support developing country Parties for the effective implementation of this Agreement."*

33 *PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (2015). "Climate action outside the UNFCCC: Assessment of the impact of international cooperative initiatives on greenhouse gas emissions". PBL Policy Brief. http://www.pbl.nl/sites/default/files/cms/pbl-2015-climate-action-outside-the-unfccc_01188.pdf*

34 *For example, concerning Africa's electrification, the initiative Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) manages a proposition of an African corridor of renewable energy, the African Union has launched the African Initiative for Renewable Energy, the US administration is working on its "Power Africa" plan, and in France Jean-Louis Borloo has launched the Foundation "Energies pour l'Afrique".*

of actions. However, given the fact that climate policies are now held in a governance arena that combines both public and private stakeholders, to be relevant, analysis on ICIs must incorporate institutional fit issues.[35] Therefore, their development must be made, as far as possible, in conjunction with other related initiatives.

ENSURE CREDIBLE TRACKING OF NON-STATE ACTORS COMMITMENTS

To achieve climate commitments effectively and maintain the peer-pressure system, all objectives and actions must be clear, measurable with explicit and transparent metrics to track progress. Ultimately, this should also help identify issues in double-accounting between non-state actors' commitments or between States and non-state actors' commitments.

To preserve the levers of the peer-pressure system and ensure more effective political coordination, the institutional framework of the Action Agenda must be strengthened. This will be one of the missions of high-level champions. While the LPAA has started building a process which aggregates non-state actors' commitments on the NAZCA platform[36], the progress towards accurately assessing non-state actors' commitments is still large. Some studies indicate that, in order to better address the elements relating to double accounting, rigorous monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) on a sectoral basis will have to be delineated (Harrison et al., 2014).

However, establishing an MRV process for ICIs similar to that of States is not necessarily the most appropriate approach. In order to make the peer-pressure system as effective as possible for ICIs, an MRV system adapted for each type of initiative that is sufficiently flexible to continue to create incentives would be required. Unlike States that are *de facto* more constrained by this pressure, an equivalent system for non-state actors could instead be prohibitive and constrain additional climate action. Moreover, the UNFCCC establishes MRV standards for Parties' domestic emissions (emissions related to the production on the national territory, and not consumption), which does not necessarily apply to all existing initiatives. It is notably for this reason that some ICIs are intended to be complementary to States contributions and not independent.

Focusing on gathering ex post data, improving exchange between academic and policy-oriented work, and developing assessment methods that accommodate diversity in terms of function, goal, and output, will be key to track the performance of the ongoing climate governance beyond the UNFCCC (Widerberg, Stripple, 2016).

In addition to the work on provision to monitor progress, the high-level champions should also mobilize independent experts in order to assess initiatives and determine which cooperative initiatives should be showcased through the activities of the champions, including the annual high-level events (GGCA, 2016d). Furthermore, high-level champions should be mandated by Parties to develop minimum criteria for defining ICIs. This would be a fair balance between the needs to catalyze the peer-pressure system and to centralize the monitoring process of ICIs. Moreover, similar to a study led the PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, the research community should undertake a comprehensive review of the experiences of ICIs in terms of governance, management and relevance (Widerberg, Pattberg, 2015).

EXPAND THE LEVERS THAT ENABLE THE EMERGENCE TRANSNATIONAL CARBON PRICING POLICIES

The topic of carbon pricing provides an interesting case study to identify possible paths of enhanced coordination. Carbon pricing policy initiatives and the ambition to link various ETSs will be likely increase as discussion on the topic continue at the highest political level.[37] This momentum could be strengthened in the coming UNFCCC negotiations which will clarify the terms for cooperative approaches established under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.

ASSESS THE CREDIBILITY OF ALL THE COMMITMENTS RELATIVE TO LONG-TERM GOALS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT OBJECTIVES

Although the current challenge is to ensure that all commitments are materialized and adhere to the necessary transparency frameworks that will underpin their effectiveness the bigger challenge will be to ensure that these commitments are compatible with long-term goals set by the Paris Agreement. While some climate initiatives may have a positive effect in the short-term, without appropriate long and medium term plans some national strategies and ICIs could fail to position themselves on path "well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels"[38] up to 2100 and beyond.

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35 *Widerberg, O. and Pattberg, P. (2015). "International Cooperative Initiatives in Global Climate Governance: Raising the Ambition Level or Delegitimizing the UNFCCC?". Global Policy, 6: 45–56. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12184/abstract*

36 *Some ICIs enable and aggregate some unilateral climate actions inventoried within the NAZCA platform. It is notably the case for initiatives such as the carbonn Climate Registry, the Investors Platform on Climate Change from the Global Investor Coalition on Climate Change (GIC), and those from CDP, The Climate Group, the Climate Bonds initiative, the Global Compact, or the Convenant of Mayors.*

37 *For more information on ICIs related to carbon pricing, see Dahan L. et al. (2016). "The Paris Agreement: a new international framework to facilitate the update of carbon pricing". I4CE – Institute for Climate Economics. March, 2016. http://www.i4ce.org/download/the-paris-agreement-a-new-international-framework-to-facilitate-the-uptake-of-carbon-pricing/*

38 *UNFCCC, Decision 1.CP/21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Article 2, Paragraph 1.(a).*

Judging the relevance of climate actions taken by public and private actors with respect to achieving long-term goals is, by and large, a transparency issue that requires significant attention. This is true for an approach based on contributions and for Kyoto-type approaches.[39] A few research centers have undertaken modelling accounting studies on States' commitments by extending current medium-term commitments. For non-state actors, initiatives such as 'Science Based Targets'[40] offer companies and investors the opportunity to make medium-term commitments compatible with long-term goals. However, as it currently stands, INDCs are very heterogeneous and difficult to assess in terms of achieving the long term goals established by the Paris Agreement.[41]

Conclusion

By reaching a global and dynamic climate treaty, and establishing the Global Climate Action Agenda in the political process, the Paris Agreement provides a new framework for international cooperation which will facilitate the coordination of climate action during the transition toward a net-zero GHG emissions and climate resilient world. Considering its long-term goals, the Paris Agreement also provides ending points to collectively focus on what need to be undertaken to fulfil these goals.

While not the ideal climate governance structure for a 'cost-effective' low-carbon transition as was the intention of the Kyoto Protocol, this new transnational approach of climate political multilateralism overcomes the stalemate of inaction and has evoked the unprecedented mobilization of commitments on climate change. However, from this new system, another prisoner's dilemma has manifested which highlights the importance of transparency: rather than waiting for the neighbour to move on climate action, it is now about understanding how other States moves, creating avenue for interaction and identification of synergies to consequently aligning on commitments (the "self-fulfilling prophecy" mentioned by Laurence Tubiana after COP21).

In the coming years, the key issues will be about the arrangement of voluntary climate actions within an effective transparency framework that will track and assess the compatibility of the commitments with the long term goals set by the Paris Agreement. At the same time, this framework will also have to help catalyze access to low-carbon solutions for all countries and stakeholders.

39 Achieving at zero net emission requires structural changes that are not necessarily captured by a change in emission reductions in the short and medium term.

40 For more information, see the "Science-based targets" initiative's website: http://sciencebasedtargets.org

41 Notably the nature of the commitment (absolute emission reductions, intensity reduction, etc.), the reference year for accounting, the baseline year of the commitment, as well as the scope of the commitment (type of GHG, sector coverage).

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