However, the debate in Europe is not trending in this direction.  Part of the industry, supported by some European leaders such as German Chancellor Merz, warns against a decline in competitiveness and calls for a weakening of the ETS and a cap on carbon prices, calling into question the future of this crucial mechanism.

As our Chairman Jean PISANI-FERRY and Executive Director Benoit LEGUET argue in Les Echos this week, taking a step back now would jeopardise Europe’s progress towards a decarbonised industrial base. I4CE’s Panorama of Climate Investments shows that, in France, an additional €4 billion in annual decarbonisation investment is required until 2030, which would be made harder if ambition is lowered.   

Indeed, the debate in Brussels and national capitals this year should focus on strengthening, not weakening the ETS. Revenues are crucial not only for supporting domestic investment in decarbonising industry today, but to supporting European mechanisms developing the climate innovation needed tomorrow, such as the EU Innovation Fund and the forthcoming Industrial Decarbonisation Bank. If we take a step back on the ETS, these important funds will suffer.

Above all, it is counterproductive to get bogged down in negotiations on a price cap. This would undermine the business model of decarbonised industry, compromise the credibility of Europe’s climate objectives, while jeopardising our climate leadership just as carbon pricing gains momentum globally.  

In the face of a new wave of backlash against the ETS, it is important to remember that chaos does not support competitiveness. Europe must remain firm, strengthening the ETS to build a world-leading, innovative green industrial base.  

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L’article Stay the course: why a stronger ETS is the key to industrial competitiveness  est apparu en premier sur I4CE.

Since 2005, the Emissions Trading System (ETS) has imposed an emissions cap on European industry. This public policy is unique in terms of its scale – it covers 40% of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions, including the electricity sector, energy-intensive industries and intra-European flights – and in terms of how it is implemented: quotas are tradable and, after a running-in period, prices have stabilised, reaching €60 to €80 per ton of CO2 in 2025. 

By gradually reducing the volume of quotas, the ETS has enabled emissions to be cut by almost half in twenty years. At these price levels, it has also stimulated innovation among manufacturers. 

2026 will see two major developments in the ETS. To reduce the risk of relocation to countries with lower carbon prices, energy-intensive sectors have until now benefited from free quotas: these will be gradually reduced until they are completely phased out in 2034. This is what worries manufacturers. 

On the other hand, to protect the European market, a carbon border adjustment mechanism has been put in place. However, it does not protect export industries. This fundamental issue can be addressed without weakening the ETS, as proposed, for example, by the Institut Montaigne. This is the first imperative.

Low-carbon leadership 

To ensure not only the survival of its industry but also its development, Europe must break free from its costly dependence on imported fossil fuels. It must therefore assume low-carbon technological leadership, the only sustainable guarantee of export competitiveness. 

This requires more innovation and more electrification. With the rise of renewables and the spectacular fall in storage costs, Europe has an increasingly abundant potential decarbonisation resource, from which manufacturers will benefit. France is particularly well placed in this respect, with abundant electricity and a good supply of biomass for decarbonisation. 

A firm hand 

It is therefore not a question of weakening the ETS, but of strengthening it. Restricting its scope or delaying its timetable would penalise manufacturers who have chosen to invest in decarbonisation and discourage future investment at a time when, on the contrary, we need to accelerate. 

The second imperative is to maintain the gradual reduction of free allowances, giving visibility to manufacturers. The auctioning of allowances enables Member States to recover substantial revenues. In France, the allowances auctioned to date represent around €2 billion per year, a figure that is set to increase. 

Supporting industry, promoting innovation 

In the future, allowances will also need to provide more substantial funding for the decarbonisation of European industrial sectors – this is the third imperative. It should be noted that this is already the case in France: French industry now receives much more for decarbonisation than it pays for the ETS. The fourth imperative is to strengthen the carbon border adjustment mechanism, for example by extending it to downstream sectors. 

The fifth and final imperative is to avoid getting bogged down in negotiations on a price cap, which could result in a very low price that would undermine the economic model of many projects and stifle innovation. It would be better to negotiate a floor price that would give manufacturers greater visibility, but this would then need to be financed. 

The same applies to the ETS as to the other components of the Green Deal: flexibility in implementation must not compromise the credibility of the objectives. This would send a disastrous signal of indecision to businesses. In an increasingly hostile international context, Europe must remain firm. This is the best service it can do for its industry. 

L’article To strengthen European industry, let’s strengthen the ETS est apparu en premier sur I4CE.

One of the main areas of focus will be the issue of financing adaptation, with the first key challenge being to mainstream the concept of resilience by design into all European funding currently under discussion, including structural policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy and the Connecting Europe Facility.

But while we need to invest better, we also need to invest more – at European level and in each Member State – to ensure climate resilience, a key component of European security and the continent’s economy.

The question is how much and in what. The difficulty lies not in a lack of analysis but in the absence of clear decisions on adaptation choices at all levels of government. What level of risk are we prepared to accept? And above all, what responses do we want to prioritise: which activities are we seeking to maintain at all costs, and what are we prepared to transform? 

Our work in France has already shown that adopting a reference trajectory – currently being considered at European level – provides a solid basis for clarifying the question of the risk to be considered. The preferred responses must be the subject of policy dialogue on a sector-by-sector and region-by-region basis. It is a question of understanding dependencies and making coherent strategic choices in terms of planning, equipment, technologies and solidarity. 

Close monitoring of expenditure contributing to adaptation shows that preparing for a changing climate has many co-benefits: it also means testing new technologies, helping to ensure the sovereignty of essential sectors, strengthening the robustness of critical infrastructure, and making agricultural, tourism and industrial development bets that may prove successful.

A clear understanding of these collective gains and how they are distributed is essential for developing the economic models that will provide the necessary fundings to meet this challenge. We come to the same conclusion when we consider the conditions for financing adaptation in developing countries. This is a central subject of I4CE‘s work programme in France, Europe and internationally in 2026. 

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L’article Risk levels and priorities: financing climate adaptation requires clear decisions est apparu en premier sur I4CE.

Just before the start of COP30 in Belém, EU Member States agreed to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 90% in 2040 compared to 1990 levels, including a 5% flexibility through international carbon credits. 

While this target provides medium-term visibility, a first milestone for 2030 is currently ahead. By then, Member are expected to reduce their emissions by 55% compared to 1990 levels. With only five years remaining, it is worth assessing whether the current pace of climate-related investment is sufficient to achieve the EU’s 2030 targets. 

In its latest report, The State of Europe’s climate investment, I4CE tracks climate investments and the associated investment needs in relation to the EU’s 2030 targets. This analysis includes, among others, the energy production sector, its transport and storage, and the production of clean technologies.

Read the full article on Inett’s website

L’article EU Member States set 2040 climate target – but is the Union on track for 2030 in the energy sector? est apparu en premier sur I4CE.

The current response to the sovereignty crisis: remove all production constraints to regain market shares 

The French agricultural and food sectors are experiencing a genuine crisis in their trade balance. The trade balance for agricultural products turned negative in 2025, reaching a level not seen since at least 2000. The balance for agri-food products has also deteriorated sharply in recent years, although it remained slightly positive in 2025. Without going into detail, this dynamic reflects both price effects and volume effects. 

As set out in the 2025 French Agricultural Orientation Law, food sovereignty conferences are being organised by the Ministry of Agriculture in 2026. The topic of food sovereignty will therefore remain central to agricultural debates this year. 

The current framing of the sovereignty issue is almost entirely limited to regaining market shares in France and abroad. The proposed solution is: remove production constraints and produce more of everything. 

This response could, however, weaken our strategic independence 

Without prejudging the effectiveness of this approach for recapturing market shares, it risks undermining our broader food sovereignty. Agricultural and food production already relies heavily on imports, much of it from countries outside the European Union. Two product families are specifically mentioned in the European Union’s Economic Security Strategy, published in December. 

First family: nitrogen mineral fertilisers, a cornerstone of crop production. These fertilisers, produced from gas, are widely used for non-organic crop production (notably wheat). More than two-thirds of nitrogen fertiliser consumption in France is imported, and 40% of these imports come from non-EU countries: Russia, Egypt, Algeria, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States (source1, source2, source3). Yet a European mechanism designed to reduce imports from outside the EU is under threat of dismantling. 

Second family: oilseed meals (soybean, rapeseed and sunflower seeds after oil extraction), a cornerstone of animal production. These meals provide a large proportion of protein in livestock feed. Approximately 45% of these meals are imported in France, and around 70% of these imports come from non-EU countries, including 62% from Brazil and 15% from Ukraine. Soy alone accounts for 70% of these imports. 

Increasing both animal and plant production would necessarily increase these imports, exposing farmers and consumers further to growing geopolitical risks. 

Genuine ecological planning is essential to truly strengthen our food sovereignty 

Improving food sovereignty and reducing imports logically entails not consuming significantly more than what our land and resources can sustainably produce. This objective aligns closely with many aspects of the ecological transition. More specifically, developing legumes, pasture-based cattle systems, organic farming, and so on — these are all levers that can reduce our dependency on fertilisers and oilseed meals and enhance farm-level autonomy. 

Ecological planning is therefore an essential response to food sovereignty, to be combined with others: adjusting the competitive framework, directing demand towards French, healthy and sustainable products in reasonable quantities, and so on. By coordinating these responses, it becomes possible to regain market shares without undermining strategic independence, and to produce today without compromising tomorrow’s production capacity. 

The ecological transition and strategic independence require investments in the agricultural and food sectors, and may involve potential capital losses. To limit the costs associated with these investments, they must be anticipated and coordinated. This need for coordination and planning is even more critical given that several waves of investment are currently underway or imminent across different agricultural and food sub-sectors in France. Food sovereignty conferences should therefore provide an opportunity to develop roadmaps by sub-sectors and regions, guiding upcoming agricultural and food investments in a logic of resilience and preservation of production capacity. 

L’article Food sovereignty relies on ecological planning est apparu en premier sur I4CE.

Carbon farming projects are in full swing in Europe: in France, the Label Bas-Carbone (Low carbon standard – LBC) is marking its sixth anniversary (see I4CE’s assessment). At the European level, the CRCF (Carbon Removals and Carbon Farming) is being developed by the European Commission and is expected to become operational in 2026. However, while the supply side is taking shape, the sticky point remains the issue of financing. This is where the LBC is currently struggling, particularly regarding agricultural projects, which face multiple problems in accessing finance. These challenges are not unique to France and could materialise at European level in going forward. The financing options currently being considered by European policy makers are mainly based on voluntary private funding. They will certainly be essential, but based on the experiences in France, we also know that they will most likely be insufficient.

In 2026, I4CE is therefore committed to contributing to the further developments for sustainable and appropriate financing for carbon farming at the European level: by analysing and sharing the lessons learnt from the Label Bas-Carbone, particularly via the European Commission’s CRCF expert group and various European research projects, but also by conducting new research to help structure credible demand, combining public and private funding, including from downstream parts of the agricultural value chain.

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L’article Financing carbon farming practices: lessons learnt in France can reinforce the EU level initiatives est apparu en premier sur I4CE.

The implementation of carbon farming practices on European farms and in European forests is key to decarbonisation and farm resilience, forest stands adaptation to climate change and for contributing to our strategic independence. 

Certifying and financing low-carbon practices is the objective of the CRCF (Carbon Removals and Carbon Farming) regulation, which will come into effect in 2026. It is therefore an opportune moment to draw lessons from six years of experience with a similar standard in France: the “Label Bas-Carbone” (Low Carbon Label – LBC). The results show that striking a balance between scientific rigour and accessibility for stakeholders has led to the development of a substantial range of projects. However, the real challenge is to build sufficient and appropriate demand to finance the projects. There is no miracle solution, but complementary financing channels could emerge. 

The search for a balance between scientific rigour and accessibility has enabled stakeholders to develop a substantial range of low-carbon projects 

In six years, nearly 2,000 forest owners and 4,000 French farmers have committed to carbon farming practices through the LBC, with an estimated potential impact of 8 Mt CO₂ combining emission reductions and carbon sequestration. These mainly involve: 1) forestry projects with afforestation and restoration of degraded forests, and 2) agricultural projects aimed in particular at optimising herd management in cattle farming, as well as fertilisation management and the introduction of intermediate cover crops in arable farming. 

The LBC’s operating model is the result of a collaborative process between field stakeholders, research and administration to find compromises that aim to ensure the scientific integrity of the system while maintaining its practicality for stakeholders in the field. This co-construction, which has been in place since the LBC’s inception, is one of the reasons for the commitment of stakeholders in the agricultural and forestry sectors, which is worth highlighting: two-thirds of the projects are directly supported by organisations from the sectors, such as agricultural and forestry cooperatives, technical institutes and forest managers. Their role is essential because the projects require technical support that is as close as possible to farmers and forest owners. The LBC has thus also played a major role in increasing the sectors’ expertise on climate issues and in the adoption of low-carbon practices. 

However, demand is currently insufficient to finance all carbon farming projects. 

While the supply of projects has grown exponentially until 2024, the main concerns today relate to project financing. Demand currently covers only half of the LBC approved projects. 

There are two types of demand: 

• Voluntary demand from companies choosing, without any regulatory constraints, to finance projects as close as possible to their territory or sector of activity. This demand is usually liked to “contribution claims”.
• Compliance demand, mainly from airlines, which are required to offset half of their domestic flight emissions in Europe.  

This demand finances at least 40% of annual LBC volumes and is therefore a key driver of the French market. 

In general, French credits are pre-financed at a much higher price than international credits: 31€/t CO₂ on average for LBCs, compared with 8 €/tCO₂ internationally. This price difference weighs on demand, even though LBC remains attractive to voluntary-buyers thanks to the credibility and the local solution it brings.

Serious concerns about the financing of agricultural projects… 

The difficulties in financing LBC projects are currently concentrated in the agricultural sector and pose major risks to the future of the scheme. Not only are farmers already engaged in carbon-farming practices at risk of not receiving the promised financial support, but a sense of mistrust is also taking hold, slowing down the commitment of new farmers to any low-carbon scheme. 

According to feedback from stakeholders in France, the funding shortfall for agricultural projects can be explained by various challenges:

• It is difficult for the LBC to mobilise the downstream part of the agricultural value chain. Due to a lack of clarity on the claims associated with LBC carbon credits, agri-food industries prefer to encourage farmers through contractual arrangements such as price premiums.
• Agricultural projects are generally less attractive than forestry projects: 
  • Agricultural credits are more expensive: around 45€/tCO₂ compared to forestry projects, which cost 25-35€/tCO₂; this is a particularly significant obstacle for compliance demand, which is primarily price-sensitive.
  • The narrative associated with low-carbon agricultural projects is more complex and less attractive than that of tree planting in forestry projects. This has a direct impact on voluntary financing. 

CRCF: multiplying options to stimulate demand to anticipate the challenges faced by the Label Bas-Carbone 

At European level, the voluntary carbon market is the most likely short-term financing option, although the CRCF was initially developed to channel various types of financing: voluntary carbon market, internal financing within value chains, compliance requirements, public subsidies (e.g. from the CAP), etc. 

However, voluntary demand is likely to remain limited: economic actors are taking a wait-and-see approach to their environmental commitments in a fluctuating economic, regulatory and societal context, which is likely to continue despite the potential trust and credibility provided by the European Commission’s endorsement of the CRCF. In general, the CRCF is likely to face the same difficulties as LBC, particularly in terms of price: European projects will remain more expensive than international ones. 

Voluntary demand will therefore need to be stimulated, but it will probably never be sufficient: the Commission is considering creating a buyers’ club to facilitate private fundraising. This proposal to bring together economic actors willing to make a long-term voluntary commitment is a concrete and interesting way of stimulating demand, but it is unlikely to be sufficient to cover the entire supply. If the example of the LBC shows us that voluntary demand is not sufficient to finance all approved projects, this will be even more true in the European context, where carbon projects with very ambitious impact targets are already being submitted (particularly under the Verra standard).  

The involvement of public authorities will be essential to ensure that the demand meets the needs

Options could include:

• The mobilisation of public funds (European or from Member States) to complement private funds, for example within the framework of the buyer’s club, would constitute significant added value. It would enable the leveraging of private funds or reduce investors risk, for example by establishing purchase commitments at a minimum price. 
• The prospect of compliance demand must also be explored. The French example shows that imposing obligations on actors in other sectors can help to structure the carbon market. Although the project for an ETS-type market for the agri-food sector is no longer on the agenda, it could resurface in the longer term. In the meantime, other options can be considered, as in the French case.
• Public authorities can also act to directly support project supply by covering part of the implementation costs, which would help to reduce tCO₂ prices. In France, subsidies are currently available for farm GHG diagnostics, the development of carbon farming action plans and support for their implementation. CAP subsidies could also play this role.
• Finally, public procurement is another lever worth exploring, and the upcoming 2026 revision of the European rules governing it represents an opportunity to be seized. 

The implementation of CRCF is a milestone for the climate transition in the sector. Still major points of vigilance remain regarding the actual funding it will provide to farmers, notably if the measure relies exclusively on the voluntary approach. The European Commission would be wise to prepare for a stronger public intervention already now. 

Policy brief developed under the Credible project

L’article On Carbon Removals and Carbon Farming the devil is in…the demand est apparu en premier sur I4CE.

A CBAM on nitrogen fertilisers would help reduce greenhouse gas emissions, while also strengthening France’s strategic independence and food sovereignty… 

The primary objective of the CBAM is to reduce “carbon leakage” linked to the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). This system increases the cost of EU production subject to it, which can encourage greater imports and thus shift CO₂ emissions elsewhere without reducing them overall. By taxing the carbon content of products imported from non-EU countries at the same level as the carbon price within the EU, the CBAM removes the comparative advantage of imports and contributes both to climate objectives and to the competitiveness of European industries. 

In its initial phase, the CBAM covers so-called “simple” products that are at high risk of carbon leakage. Nitrogen-based mineral fertilisers, widely used in crop production, are among these products. However, on 7 January 2026, the French Minister of Agriculture announced that it had secured the temporary exclusion of fertilisers from the mechanism (retroactive to 1 January). 

Yet, particularly for France, a CBAM on fertilisers would be a powerful lever for strategic independence and food sovereignty. France is the largest importer of nitrogen fertilisers in the EU: in 2024, more than two-thirds of the nitrogen consumed was imported (source 1, source 2), generating a trade deficit of €1.1 billion. While 60% of these imported nitrogen fertilisers come from within the European Union, the remainder mainly comes from Egypt, Algeria, the United States, Russia, and Trinidad and Tobago. Reducing these imports would also reduce our dependence on these countries for a product as strategic as fertilisers for French agricultural and food production. This objective should be even more of a priority in 2026, as the “food sovereignty conferences” required by the Agricultural Orientation Act are due to begin. 

…but risk increasing farmers’ costs if the right public policies are not implemented 

The CBAM increases the cost of fertilisers for importers, and therefore for farmers. The level of the tax has thus been limited for fertilisers, reducing the additional cost to around 7% in 2026 according to the European Commission, and fertilisers may be temporarily excluded from the scope of the tax. However, this additional cost will eventually materialise once the CBAM provisions are fully applied. Without other changes, this would lead to a substantial increase in fertiliser costs for arable farming sectors (cereals, oilseeds and protein crops, etc.), which have already experienced three consecutive years of unfavourable economic conditions. 

This increase in costs is not inevitable. Although it is far from easy, farmers can reduce their use of synthetic nitrogen fertilisers. Consumption has already fallen by 15% since 2020 in response to price increases caused by the war in Ukraine. The draft National Low-Carbon Strategy plans a further reduction of the same magnitude by 2030, and a halving by 2050 compared with 2020 levels. 

Three main, non-mutually exclusive pathways are available to farmers to reduce their consumption of nitrogen fertilisers, outlined here in order of increasing difficulty of implementation:

• Optimising fertilisers use practices, i.e. maintaining or even increasing yields while using less fertiliser but in a more efficient way.
• Replacing synthetic mineral fertilisers with organic fertilisers, in particular livestock effluents but also crop residues.
• Introducing legumes into crop rotations, i.e. adding a legume crop (peas, faba beans, soybeans, lentils, etc.) into the sequence of crops grown on fields (wheat, barley, oilseed rape, for example). These crops have the ability to capture nitrogen from the atmosphere and store it in the soil for the following crop. 

Some of the public policies supporting a reduction of nitrogen fertilisers are under threat and need to be preserved 

Without listing all the barriers to the adoption of these practices, we draw attention to two public policies that are currently under threat, despite being key to removing certain obstacles. 

First, the scheme supporting the structuring of plant protein value chains benefit from very little public funding. Yet this measure is essential, as one of the major barriers for farmers is the lack of sufficiently attractive markets for these crops. Introduced alongside other ecological planning measures in the 2024 state budget, it was initially allocated €100 million in commitment appropriations and €65 million in payment appropriations. These funds were drastically reduced following budget cuts: only €14 million was actually spent in 2024, and no funding was explicitly allocated for 2025 or for 2026 in the government’s initial draft. The government finally announced on 10 January that €30 million would be allocated to the protein plan and two other measures. The same letter also announced €40 million in aid for the most vulnerable arable farming operations; it would be relevant for this aid to steer farms towards low-input systems. 

Second, the implementation of the Arable crops method under the Low-Carbon Label is under threat, notably due to a lack of funding. The Label certifies greenhouse gas emission reductions and CO₂ storage from agricultural and forestry projects, with the aim of securing remuneration from mainly private actors. The arable crops method certifies projects in arable farming and covers, among other things, the three levers described above. However, agricultural projects under the Label are currently facing significant difficulties, notably due to a lack of private funding, which is more often directed towards forestry projects. This tool is nevertheless particularly well suited to providing financial support to farmers while maintaining the objective of reducing emissions, particularly those linked to fertilisers. 

These schemes can be partially financed by private actors, through voluntary or mandatory participation, but they require a minimum level of public funding to be mobilised immediately. In the medium term, once the CBAM is fully applied to fertilisers, all or part of the revenues from this tax could be allocated to these tools, in order to support farmers while improving both our carbon footprint and our sovereignty. 

L’article CBAM and fertilisers: ring-fencing budgets to help farmers reduce their use of mineral fertilisers est apparu en premier sur I4CE.

This is highly necessary. Freeing ourselves from fossil fuels is impactful for and key to our sovereignty, competitiveness, public finances, purchasing power, and security. In a nutshell, existential for Europe.  

While electrification is definitely not a silver-bullet solution for reducing our greenhouse gas emissions, it is an essential tool. It is relevant in at least two areas: light mobility, where oil reigns supreme today and it is difficult to imagine an alternative to electric vehicles in the future; and the deployment of heat pumps in buildings as a lever that can be activated for ambitious renovations.

Still, significant challenges remain for the large-scale adoption of these technologies. End of 2025, the European Commission proposed to lower the ambition for the phase out of combustion engine vehicles by 2035 and let go of the long foreseen Heat Pump Action Plan. This puts deployment at risk. It could slow down the car industry’s transition to electric vehicles amid intensifying global competition. It also likely further reduces investment in heat pumps, which was already declining in 2023 and 2024. 

In our newsletter, we recommend some useful reading material to help you navigate this electric year, including reports on investments in electrification; housing renovation and heat pumps; the automotive industry and vehicle electrification; and the accessibility of electric solutions for households. 

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L’article 2026: An electric atmosphere est apparu en premier sur I4CE.

Climate action is now often portrayed in the public debate as too costly, because it requires major investment. Ineffective, since our share of global emissions is small. Unfair, because it cuts into purchasing power. Too divisive, supported only by part of the electorate. Too late, since keeping the planet below +2°C of warming now seems out of reach. Arguments that are partly true—yet require substantial nuance. 

Ten years after the Paris Agreement, the reasons to act on climate have not disappeared; in fact, they have become even more compelling. They fall into four broad categories: strengthening our security; safeguarding our sovereignty; improving our competitiveness; and supporting the sustainability of our public finances. 

In response to a dramatically different global context, climate action must align with those issues. To do so, we must focus on three priorities: eliminating fossil fuels; adapting to climate change; and boosting domestic production of green technologies. 

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1. Eliminating fossil fuels—for our sovereignty, our public finances, and our security

In 2019 and 2020, part of the French Government met as an “ecological defense council,” a prescient notion, given how stark our costly dependence on fossil fuels has since become. The war in Ukraine highlighted Europe’s deep reliance on fossil fuels: oil for transport; natural gas for buildings and housing; for industry; and for agriculture via nitrogen fertilizers. Radically reducing our need for fossil fuels is therefore an imperative for the continent’s sovereignty. 

To illustrate, last year, France imported almost all the fossil fuels it consumed, at a cost of €63 billion. Three years earlier, the bill was nearly double: €118 billion (SDES, 2024 Energy Report). Accelerating the transition means ridding ourselves of these costly dependencies. Recent history should encourage faster action. The sharp rise in energy prices following Russia’s attempted invasion of Ukraine in 2022 forced the French Government to urgently implement consumer protection mechanisms—for households, local authorities, and businesses—to avoid social unrest. The budgetary cost for the French State exceeded €70 billion in under three years (Banque de France, 2024). More than double what the State usually dedicates each year to supporting the transition (Green Budget 2026, favorable expenditures). 

France is also heavily dependent on nitrogen fertilizers, produced from natural gas, 66% to 80% of which are imported (French Ministry of Agriculture, 2022, 2024). Optimizing fertilizer use and replacing synthetic mineral fertilizers with organic alternatives are key to improving strategic independence; introducing legumes into crop rotations also reduces dependence on nitrogen fertilizers and on soybean meal for animal feed, itself imported 80% of the time (French Ministry of Ecological Transition). 

Many of these fossil fuel imports come from countries which supply may be less reliable over the long term. Ecological transition is thus an imperative for the continent’s security: last year, the European Union imported nearly €22 billion in Russian fossil fuels, effectively contributing to the war effort against Ukraine—and to any future military ventures by Vladimir Putin. Bringing our imports of Russian oil and gas to zero as quickly as possible is therefore a defense priority, aligned with increased military spending. 

Several countries seem ready to tackle this well-known problem of fossil-fuel dependence. Although the final COP30 agreement in Belém omits the phase-out of fossil fuels, 80 countries—European, Latin American, and island states—have nonetheless united to call for a roadmap to exit fossil fuels. 

As a bonus, reducing fossil fuel use often reduces emissions of other air pollutants, which also have a significant social cost—for example, €4 billion per year in France from road traffic NO₂ (Santé publique France, 2025).

2. Adapting to climate change—for our security, competitiveness, and public finances

Backlash or not, climate impacts are accelerating, striking our regions more often and more severely. Built infrastructure (buildings, transport, energy, water networks…) and natural systems (forests, wetlands…) may no longer be capable of providing the services for which they were designed. With climate impacts, “every tenth of a degree counts,” imposing risks—and costs—on our economy. 

Ensuring that students can learn in classrooms where it isn’t 35°C, that city centers can maintain livable temperatures, that firefighters have the resources needed to face fires and floods, that our healthcare system does not collapse at every heatwave… all of this has a cost. But it is the best investment we can make: allocating adequate budgetary resources and making public and private investment climate-proof. This is not an environmental issue — it is one of personal safety, productivity, and territorial competitiveness. 

Investing in climate adaptation also reduces risks for public finances, already under strain. For example, climate events in 2022 in France, including the summer drought, required more than €2 billion in public aid for the agricultural sector alone—and, of course, caused major production losses.

3. Betting on cleantech—for our sovereignty and competitiveness

Donald Trump’s pro-fossil-fuel rhetoric should not obscure a clear reality: the race for cleantech is underway between the United States and China. And in this race, the European Union—far behind—faces at least three challenges: higher energy and labor costs; a less dynamic investment environment; and the consequences of the US Inflation Reduction Act and China’s Made in China 2025 strategy. 

From the Green Industrial Plan to proposals for a more flexible EU budget, the Commission is signaling renewed ambition: to strengthen the continent’s decarbonizing industrial base and develop strategic clean-technology sectors at scale. Limited resources must target where they will have the greatest impact. Europe must act together to identify priority technologies and sectors that will drive decarbonization, resilience, and competitiveness in the decades ahead. 

Among cleantech sectors, one in particular deserves the attention of Europe and France: electric mobility. The shift to electric vehicles now seems inevitable. In twenty-five years, once all cars on the road are electric, we may wonder how our societies relied for so long on a service—essential in many areas—that depended on fuel distributed outside the home. The combustion engine will seem to the electric car what the oil lamp is to the LED, or the well to running water. And the shift will have been made for comfort, not for the climate. 

The risk we face is that Europe might end up producing the world’s most competitive hybrid and combustion engines—just as global demand collapses—while China and perhaps others sell batteries and electric vehicles everywhere. A risk of technological lag, which may also threaten us in other cleantech sectors.

4. What remains is to act: plan the transition and make it accessible

There is no shortage of reasons to pursue climate action. Reducing ambition—or worse, reversing course—could cost us dearly on many fronts. Implementing the transition requires two pillars. 

The first pillar is planning. We will not reach fossil-fuel independence or carbon neutrality by accident, in France or in Europe. That is the purpose of planning for the ecological transition, and integrating it into all public policies. Planning must be led at the highest political level; include objectives, trajectories, and budgetary means; and anticipate the unpredictable—be it energy price fluctuations, necessary military spending, or trade wars. Ecological transition planning is not the Gosplan; it is above all a tool to coordinate expectations among all actors in a value chain (industry, suppliers, customers, financiers…), enabling them to pivot together. For a green transition plan to be credible, it must as a consequence include a financing plan. 

The second pillar is making the transition accessible. Expecting economic actors—especially households—to embrace the transition when they lack access to fossil-free alternatives (electric cars, public transport, home insulation, heating changes…) only breeds rejection and leads us into a dead end. Ensuring access to transition solutions is therefore a major challenge for climate policy. Particular attention must be paid to low-income and middle-income households, so that the investments required for the transition are economically viable for them. 

If these two pillars are properly integrated into public policy, let us hope that by Paris +20, in 2035, France and Europe will have helped bring about a “better world”—for people, business and the planet alike. 

L’article Paris +10: France and Europe must step up on climate – to protect our security, sovereignty, competitiveness, and public finances est apparu en premier sur I4CE.