Publications

As the European Commission prepares an integrated framework on climate resilience and risk management for the EU, the public consultation has just wrapped up – an important step towards the publication of the proposals for the framework later this year. One of the main areas of focus will be the issue of financing adaptation, with the first key challenge being to mainstream the concept of resilience by design into all European funding currently under discussion, including structural policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy and the Connecting Europe Facility.

Adaptation needs in emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) are rising rapidly, yet current financing assessments systematically underestimate the scale of the challenge. This paper calls for a shift from headline finance targets towards strategies that fully integrate cost of capital considerations, combining concessional finance, revenue mobilisation, and structural reforms to unlock durable and scalable investment in climate adaptation in EMDEs.

This report, originally published in French in September 2025, is a contribution to the public debate on adaptation in France. The methodologies applied, the data collection process, as well as the analytical framework proposed, may inform broader discussions in Europe, as the preparations for an EU integrated framework for European climate resilience and risk management are well underway. 

An outlook on EU investment needs for the energy transition and the EU’s 2040 climate target. Just before the start of COP30 in Belém, EU Member States agreed to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by 90% in 2040 compared to 1990 levels, including a 5% flexibility through international carbon credits. 

The upcoming food sovereignty conferences are likely to shape debates on the future of French agriculture in 2026. The main responses provided over the past two years can be summarised as follows: remove production constraints to produce more of everything (both animal and plant products), to recover market shares in France and abroad. Seeking to produce more of everything without considering adaptation or transition is a form of denial, at a time when climate change is hitting farmers hard and regularly, and when our dependence on imported fertilisers and oilseed meals undermines our sovereignty. The conferences must take these considerations into account — otherwise, they will serve only to perpetuate the notion of an illusory sovereignty. 

Les choix d’investissements des secteurs agricoles et alimentaires des années à venir sont déterminants. Pour pérenniser leurs productions et faire face aux crises, les secteurs agricoles et alimentaires français doivent évoluer vers des systèmes plus résilients et durables. L’enjeu est d’autant plus crucial que différentes vagues d’investissements sont en cours ou à venir dans ces secteurs. Dans cette étude, I4CE a estimé qu’environ 100 milliards d’euros d’outils de production agricoles et alimentaires sont affectés par la transition. Une coordination et une planification des investissements semblent incontournables, notamment pour en limiter les coûts.

In a challenging economic and political context, especially for the agriculture sector, some incentive schemes can still help bring stakeholders together in climate transition and resilience initiatives. This is the case with carbon certification schemes, which both ensure the credibility of the climate impact of the actions implemented and provide remuneration for farmers and foresters for changes in practices. Some of these measures, such as replacing mineral fertilisers (mostly imported) with organic fertilisers, also help to meet the sector's needs for resilience and strategic independence, which are crucial in the current context.

The implementation of carbon farming practices on European farms and in European forests is a lever for achieving carbon neutrality, but also for farm resilience, the adaptation of forest stands to climate change and for contributing to our strategic independence. Certifying and financing low-carbon practices is the objective of the CRCF (Carbon Removals and Carbon Farming) regulation, which will come into effect in 2026. Now seems the right time to draw lessons from six years of experience with a similar standard in France: the “Label Bas-Carbone” (Low Carbon Label - LBC). The results show that striking a balance between scientific rigour and accessibility for stakeholders has led to the development of a substantial range of projects. However, the real challenge is to build sufficient and appropriate demand to finance the projects. There is no miracle solution, but complementary financing channels may emerge. 

The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) came into force on 1 January 2026. It is a carbon tax applied at the borders of the European Union to imports of certain industrial products covered by the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). Nitrogen-based mineral fertilisers are included in this initial list of products. To avoid an increase in costs for the farmers concerned, the level of the tax has been reduced for fertilisers, and they may even be temporarily excluded from the scope of the CBAM. Yet, for the climate, but also for France’s strategic independence and food sovereignty, the CBAM will ultimately have to be fully applied to mineral fertilisers. To limit or even avoid an increase in farmers’ fertiliser expenditure, we need public policies – some of which are currently under threat. Ring-fencing budgets for these policies would be a way to support farmers’ incomes and the food sovereignty of both the European Union and France, while reducing the carbon footprint of our food system. 

The year ahead promises to be electric. In a highly unpredictable geopolitical context, the European Union must balance its commitment to the long-term goals of climate neutrality and the immediate attention to security and competitiveness concerns. This puts electrification high on the agenda in Brussels. First, the Grids Package, presented in December 2025, provides for a more centralised approach to planning and is expected to be adopted by the Council in June. Second, before the summer, the Commission intends to present an Electrification Action Plan, which will focus on lowering prices and reinforcing demand. 

How distant December 12, 2015 now seems. All delegations at COP21 had then rallied behind Laurent Fabius’s little green hammer. Ten years later, the trend is closer to backlash. Climate action is now often portrayed in the public debate as too costly, because it requires major investment. Ineffective, since our share of global emissions is small. Unfair, because it cuts into purchasing power. Too divisive, supported only by part of the electorate. Too late, since keeping the planet below +2°C of warming now seems out of reach. Arguments that are partly true—yet require substantial nuance. 

A few weeks ago, COP30 concluded in Belém with all parties agreeing on a “global mobilization” (or mutirão) against climate change, proving that multilateralism remains a viable path for action, despite strong geopolitical and economic headwinds. However, Belém delivered underwhelming results: no roadmap to transition away from fossil fuels –despite a powerful push from President Lula, rallying over 80 countries, a lack of concrete decisions on deforestation –disappointing for an “Amazon COP”, and mixed results on the global goal on adaptation, among other outcomes.  

In the run up to the publication of the European Commission’s proposals for an automotive package on 10 December, car manufactures have stepped up the calls to relax the CO2 standards and the 2035 phase-out of new combustion-engine vehicles by including some flexibilities. They highlight the challenges the industry has faced in recent years, growing competitive pressure from China, and insufficient demand for electric vehicles in Europe as reasons for the sector needing more time for the transition required to meet the targets.

Recently, car manufacturers have been calling for a relaxation of CO2 emission standards for cars and vans and the 2035 phase-out target for new internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles, by including some flexibilities. They point in particular to the crisis the industry has faced in recent years, growing competitive pressure from China, and insufficient demand for electric vehicles (EVs) in Europe, as reasons for the sector needing more time for the transition required to meet the targets. As the European Commission (EC) prepares to publish its package for the automotive industry, including a revision of CO₂ standards for cars and vans, this blogpost examines the realities behind the difficulties currently faced by car manufacturers and the consequences of relaxing and postponing the planned EU regulations for this sector. 

With the aim to reduce its CO2 emissions and costly fossil-fuel imports, in 2022 the European Parliament adopted a rule that, from 2035, all new vehicles must be zero-emission, which essentially means that they must be electric. However, this rule is now being questioned, with car manufacturers requesting that it be revised to allow plug-in […]

COP30 concluded with an agreement, proving that multilateralism is still alive. However, the results are underwhelming: no push to transition away from fossil fuels, no decision on deforestation, and mixed outcomes on adaptation metrics.  On climate finance, Belém failed to shift from ambition to implementation. Negotiations quickly drifted back to a battle on yet another high-level quantitative target. The decision to triple adaptation funding by 2035 disappointed many, with its distant time horizon, lack of baseline and non-binding wording. COP30 also missed the opportunity to engage with – and build consensus around – concrete measures outlined in the Baku to Belém roadmap to get to $1.3 trillion. Instead, it defaulted to launching new processes – a work programme on climate finance and a ministerial roundtable on the NCQG.  

Climate change does not conform to business, political or supervisory regime cycles– its adverse long-term impacts lie beyond such horizons. Ten years ago, when Mark Carney highlighted this paradox in his landmark Tragedy of the Horizons speech, climate change was not considered a financial stability risk. Today, European supervisory stress tests estimate up to €638 billion in banking losses over 8 years, while the European Central Bank (ECB) reveals that over 90% of eurozone banks face climate and environmental risks. A key question arises: Is the supervisors’ primary focus on greening the financial system sufficient in the face of rising risks, especially stranded assets? 

The climate and development finance gap is large and widening, as Official Development Assistance (ODA) declines and needs multiply. With shrinking fiscal space in vulnerable countries, solidarity levies are gaining attention as a predictable source of international finance. Launched at COP28 by Barbados, France, and Kenya, the Global Solidarity Levies Task Force (GSLTF) is the main initiative in this space.

National Public Banks (NPBs) and Subnational Public Financial Institutions (SPFIs), including development banks and agencies as well as climate and green funds at the subnational level, play an increasingly vital role in financing climate action and the just transition. While national governments provide frameworks aligned with nationally determined contributions (NDCs), actual implementation occurs largely at the subnational level, which currently lacks sufficient funding. SPFIs can work as financial intermediaries, as they not only understand local needs and have stronger ties with local governments and businesses, but also access much larger volumes of capital from more diverse sources. 

"What agreement will the negotiators reach?” is the question that is usually on climate practitioners’ minds at this time of the year. However, this time, it is a new impetus that is needed, not another agreement. 10 years after the Paris Agreement, the Brazilian COP30 presidency has rightly shifted the focus to execution, making this edition “the implementation COP.” On financing, the objectives set at COP29 are clear: developing countries should receive $300 billion per year by 2035 from developed countries (NCQG), and mobilise $1.3 trillion per year from all actors. The newly published "Baku to Belém" roadmap proposes solutions to meet the targets. We now have objectives and a list of (theoretical) means to achieve them. How do we move to implementation?