Publications

Climate change and ecological planning are taking centre stage in this autumn’s budgetary measures. The public finance programming act, which has yet to be discussed with the Senate, now requires the government to set out a multi-year funding strategy for planning. The finance bill for 2024, which will go through Parliament soon, earmarks an additional €7 billion in transition support for households, businesses and local authorities. This €7 billion does not, however, resolve the issue of financing the climate transition, and in this post we provide an overview of the key climate debates that will take place, or ought to take place according to I4CE, during this veritable marathon budget.

The financing strategy, an essential element of ecological planning, has previously been set out annually in the finance bill. From now on, the government will be drawing up a multi-year strategy that will give both the State and the private sector a clear view of the future. This was long overdue.

Twelve EU Member States have started implementing new budgetary processes to help align their public budgets with climate objectives. Green budget tagging, a prominent tool, can provide a clear picture of the share of a national budget that is aligned, or runs counter, with the national climate strategy. France publishes its annual green budget every year and now, for the first time in 2023, the government intends to use its data for the preparation of the draft budget law.

National budgets, as the main driver of public action, need to be ‘greened’ by governments to achieve the transition to low-carbon, climate-resilient, and sustainable economies. That is, budgeting processes need to ensure sufficient funds are directed towards green activities and are directed away from environmentally harmful ones.

Emmanuel Macron certainly made a mistake in calling for a European “regulatory pause” on the environment. In the same speech, he however expressed a truth that is essential to the debate: “Europe and France risk being the best-in-class in terms of regulation, and the worst-in-class in terms of financing”. It went unnoticed but, as highlighted in this I4CE newsletter, the time has come for a debate on how the EU can better finance the climate transition. And there is no time like the present! In precisely one year, on June 9th 2024, hundreds of millions of Europeans will vote for a new European Parliament, that will in term elect a new European Commission that will negotiate the future EU budget.

How does the government plan to finance the increase in its public spending on climate action? Further to the government’s reactions to the Pisani-Ferry report, which proposes using all options, including debt and tax increases, let us make an assumption: what if the government were to rely solely on budget saving options? I4CE's Damien Demailly reviews the savings options available to the government. Clearly, they are all difficult to implement and some may prove counterproductive. They are nevertheless on the government’s agenda and are worth explaining and discussing, as are all options to finance the transition.

Let’s cut to the chase. Emmanuel Macron was wrong to drop a rhetorical bomb on Thursday, 11 May, when he called for a “regulatory pause” in environmental legislation. And that was a real shame because shortly after doing so, he said something important that went unnoticed by the analysts: Europe and France risk “being the best performers in terms of regulation, and the worst performers in terms of financing”.

Faced with international competition exacerbated by the US Inflation Reduction Act, Team Europe (and longtime team member, France) is preparing its response. The team’s tactics tackle two challenges: greening existing industrial sectors such as steel or cement, and industrialising the production of green goods, particularly those cleantechs that will make the transition a reality, such as heat pumps or electrolysers. To meet the first challenge, the French government has put 5 to 10 billion euros of public money on the table to decarbonise the most polluting production sites, in return for private investment. But has the extent of the industrial investment needs been properly assessed?

As the world enters a new era of cleantech competition, policymakers must confront two key policy questions - regulation and investment. The Net Zero Industry Act is Europe’s response to the former. Yet key concerns around permitting, sectoral targets and the scope of the Act will need to be addressed if it is to be effective, argue Thomas Pellerin-Carlin and Ciarán Humphreys in this blog post.

Last August, the US Congress adopted the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). It became the epicentre of EU fears of seeing cleantech projects, like battery or solar panel gigafactories, settling in the US rather than in the EU. There is some rationality behind that fear. The IRA indeed provides sizable public funding, with 10 years predictability and the simplicity of having a single federal level scheme. Moreover, the IRA does not only subsidize cleantech manufacturing. For instance, in the case of electric vehicles, the IRA supports the mining of critical minerals, the manufacturing of the battery, the purchase of the electric car and the production of renewable electricity. In other words, with IRA the US now has a genuine long-term climate investment plan.

For years, the European Union assumed it would lead the cleantech race because it was the only one running in it. Mistakenly so. With the Inflation Reduction Act, the US quickly catches up. This brief argues that the best EU policy answer to the IRA is an EU long‑term climate investment plan. As the political appetite for such a plan is currently limited, the European Commission should use the political momentum to propose a targeted investment plan that focuses on the development, scale-up, manufacturing and deployment of clean technologies in the EU. It identifies three first bricks that can already be laid out to build this plan.

This year again, expectations for the COP are high regarding developed countries’ commitments towards the funding of action against climate change and its impacts. The question of loss and damage, which pertains to questions of climate justice and of who should pay for the significant impacts of climate change endured by the poorest countries, has just been added to the official COP agenda. And climate finance will again be a hot topic: the pledge made back in 2009 by rich nations to channel US$100bn every year by 2020 to help less wealthy nations mitigate the rise in temperatures and adapt to climate change is still falling short of targets.

Long term national climate strategies, such as Long-Term Strategies (LTS) published to the UNFCCC, are key documents developed by governments to envision the transition to a low-carbon and climate resilient economy at the 2050 (or later) time-horizon. As of the beginning of COP 27 in Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt, on November 2022, 55 countries had submitted an LTS to the UNFCCC, answering renewed calls for countries to develop such strategies at COP 26. It is expected that additional LTS will be published shortly. 

Number of climate public policies have social impacts, and conversely. To foster the consideration of these joint climate and social effects in the development of public policies, actors are calling to turn the increasingly popular climate budget tagging exercises into climate AND social budget tagging exercises. Is it a good idea? Chloé Boutron and Solène Metayer, who attempted the exercise, are sharing their insights.

In this op-ed published in a French economic newspaper, Benoît Leguet, director of I4CE, considers that the French Government must plan over the long term the necessary financing for climate change mitigation and adaptation, by instituting a public finance programming law for climate. France has set itself climate objectives, it must clarify what means it will devote to them.

  Of course, public money will not do everything; but without public money, it seems difficult today to conceive of a transition that is acceptable to all and sufficiently ambitious. With the French presidential campaign about to begin, the budget that the goverment allocates to the transition will certainly be the subject of intense debate. […]

A few days after the publication of France's 2021 budget bill, and before any debates in parliament, the government released an environmental assessment of it. This assessment, often referred to as the "green budget", is an important step forward for the transparency of public action, according to Marion Fetet and Sébastien Postic from I4CE. Nevertheless, they suggest improvements to be made to the scope of the budget analyzed or to the classification of certain expenditures. And they call for making the green budget a real tool for greening the budget.

Few green budgeting initiatives have led to concrete reforms or revisions of priority investments. How can we move from simple theoretical exercises to concrete action for the environment? This is the question asked by Sébastien Postic of I4CE, Oskar Lecuyer of AFD and Jennifer Doherty-Bigara of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

2 billion euros: this is the amount that the French government will bet on hydrogen until 2022 as part of its recovery plan. An amount that will increase to reach 5.7 billion by 2030. I4CE invited researchers Jean-Pierre Ponssard from Polytechnique/CNRS and Guy Meunier from INRAE, both members of the Energy & Prosperity Chair, to analyze France's "hydrogen plan".

The French government has just officially unveiled the content of its €100 billion recovery plan, part of which is dedicated to the fight against climate change.